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The notion East Prussia concerns an area of the former Electoral Prussia 
including Ermland annexed in 1772. After World War the First, according to 
the peace treaty of Versailles of 28 June, 1919 the area should remain under 
German sovereignty. However, an attachment of its southern part should be 
decided by its population in a plebiscite.1 As the results of the plebiscite were 
unfavourable to Poland, nearly the whole territory of East Prussia belonged to 
the Third Reich before World War the Second. It constituted an exclave of the 
Third Reich, and the treaty of Versailles contained provisions dealing with the 
freedom of passage between the Reich and East Prussia through Polish terri­
tory.2
The problem of the so-called corridor of Pomerania, causing numerous 
conflicts, the long boundary between Poland and East Prussia, and an extreme 
militarization of East Prussia, constituted potentially a great danger for the 
security and territorial integrity of the Polish State. It should be recalled that 
a request to establish an extraterritorial railway and highway through Polish 
territory played an important role in claims of Germany before World War the 
Second.3 The experience of the interwar period and of the military campaign of 
September 1939 proved an enormous danger for Poland connected with the 
existence of an enemy and militarized area being in the past a cradle o f the 
Prussian militarism in its direct neighbourhood.4
1 Cf. Articles 9 4 -  98 of the peace treaty of Versailles.
2 Article 89 of the Treaty of Versailles, in connection with a pactum de contrahendo of 
Art. 98.
3 Cf. the memorandum of the German Government to the Polish Government on the annulment 
of the Polish-German declaration of 24 January 1934 -  cf. L. G e 1 b e r g (ed.): Prawo między­
narodowe i historia dyplomatyczna. Wybór dokumentów (International Law and Diplomatic 
History. Selected Documents), vol. II, at 514 -  518 (1958); see also; the speech by A. Hitler at 
the Reichstag of 28 April, 1939, ibidem, at 518 -  521.
4 Comp. A. K l a f k o w s k i ,  Ustawa nr 46 o likwidacji Prus z dnia 25 II 1947 (The Law 
Ho. 46 on the Abolition o f Prussia o f 25 February, 1947), (1956).
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2. General principles of interpretation
The future of East Prussia should have been decided during the Potsdam 
meeting of the Three Powers: United Slates, United Kingdom and Soviet Union. 
From the beginning of World War the Second there was a general agreement 
among the member states of the anti-Nazi coalition that Eastern Prussia should 
not belong to Germany after the war. The problem shall be dealt with later; we 
remark here only that the conference of Potsdam was preceded by: Polish claims 
to the territory of East Prussia as a whole, claims by the Soviet Union presented 
by Stalin during the meeting in Tehran and consequently upheld in following 
activities of the Soviet diplomacy, and finally a general regulation of the Decla­
ration of Yalta on Poland.
The problem of East Prussia was dealt with by provisions of two chapters of 
the Potsdam Agreement: VI City o f Konigsberg and the Adjacent Area and 
IX.B Poland, and also indirectly by chapter XIII Orderly Transfers o f German 
Populations.5
In Chapter VI the three Powers agreed that „the section o f the Western 
frontier o f the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which is adjacent to the 
Baltic Sea should pass from a point on the eastern shore o f the Bay o f Danzig 
to the east, north o f the line Braunsberg-Goldap, to the meeting point o f the 
frontiers o f Lithuania, Republic of Poland and East Prussia (underlines T.J.)”.6 
This statement was accompanied by the general agreement on the ultimate 
transfer to the Soviet Union o f the City o f Konigsberg and the area adjacent 
to it. These provisions were complemented by the provision of the Chapter IX.B, 
according to which the former German territories (...) including that portion 
of East Prussia not placed under the administration o f the Union o f Soviet 
Socialist Republics in accordance with the understanding reached at this 
Conference (...) shall be under the administration o f the Polish State and for 
such purposes should not be considered as part o f the Soviet Zone o f occupation 
in Germany.1
2.1. The text and context of the Potsdam Agreement
The use of the meaningful terms frontier o f the USSR and ultimate transfer 
would indicate -  even if the notion of administration used in the Chapter IX.B 
of the Agreement is not quite clear -  that East Prussia should have been definitely
5 Cf. Official Gazelle o f the Control Council fo r  Germany, Suppl., at 13 el seq (1946).
6 It is rarely remarked that Lithuania survived the Second World War, at least in the wording 
of the Potsdam Agreement. Taking into account numerous critical opinions as to the use of the 
nameEast Prussia in the context of the effects of the Second World War, it is important that this 
name was used also in the Potsdam Agreement. It is understandable, as the decision on the 
dissolution of the Prussian State was taken later.
7 See: comments by K. S k u b i s z e w s k i :  Zachodnia granica Polski (The Western Frontier 
o f Poland) 497 (1969).
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partitioned between Poland and the Soviet Union, according to the legally binding 
decision of the Powers. It occurs, however, that the wording of Chapter VI is 
imprecise and it contains an express statement that they do not constitute a final, 
binding territorial decision.
In the first alinea of Chapter VI the general description of the boundary line 
is preceded by an express reservation pending the final determination o f terri­
torial questions at the peace settlement* The acceptance by the Powers of the 
ultimate transfer of the Konigsberg area is weakened by the expression in prin­
ciple used in alinea 2. Finally, in the following alinea the acceptance is called 
the proposal o f the Conference, to be supported by the government of the United 
States and United Kingdom at the forthcoming peace settlement.
It can be concluded that the Potsdam Agreement did not settle in a legally 
binding way the problem of the territorial sovereignty in East Prussia. The use 
of the notions frontier or ultimate transfer do not justify contrary opinions as to 
the final character of the regulation. Similarly, an argument referring to dere- 
lictio based upon a mass evacuation of German population from the territory 
of East Prussia escaping approaching Soviet troops does not solve the problem 
of conflicting territorial titles of Poland and the USSR with respect to sove­
reignty in East Prussia.9
Other notions like north-eastern part o f east Prussia with Konigsberg as 
an open portxo or incorporation o f East Prussia west and south o f the line 
from Konigsberg eastwards to the Curzon line into Poland11 can be found in 
a later correspondence between the heads of the Great Powers. More precise 
provisions can be found in the agreement of 27 July, 1944 between the Polish 
Committee of National Liberation (the provisional government established in 
the Polish territory occupied by the Soviet Army) and the government of the 
USSR on the delimitation of frontier. The parlies agreed 'hat the northern part 
of the territory o f East Prussia passes to the Soviet Union, and the remaining 
part o f East Prussia and the area o f Gdańsk including the city and port o f 
Gdańsk passes to Poland (Art. 2).12 The frontier was traced (a). From a villa­
ge Myczkowce along the rivers Solokiya and Western Bug to Lithuania (under­
lined by T.J.) and (b). west o f the coast o f the Bay o f Gdańsk (Art. 3). It can be 
concluded that Soviet claims formulated before the conference of Potsdam cannot
8 This formula was agreed during the Crimea Conference -  see: the last alinea of Declaration 
VI Poland.
9 See: K. S k u b i s z e w s k i ,  op. cit., at 372, 264, 430 and 429, respectively.
10 Sprawa polska podczas drugiej wojny światowej na arenie międzynarodowej. Zbiór doku­
mentów (The Polish Question during the Second World War. Selected Documents) 471 (1965); 
oraz Dokumenty i materiały do historii stosunków polsko-radzieckich (Documents and Materials 
on the History o f Polish-Soviet Relations) vol. VIII, 35 (1974).
11 Sprawa polska, 569; Dokumenty i materiały, vol. VIII, 42.
12 The agreement has been published in Polish in Polska Ludowa -  Związek Radziecki. 1944 -  
1974. Zbiór dokumentów i materiałów (People's Poland — the Soviet Union. 1944 -  1974. Co­
llection o f Documents and Materials) 12 et seq. (1974). Cf. also a German translation by 
A. Uschakov in Internationales Rccht und Diplomatic vol. II, 71 ff (1970).
50 TADEUSZ JASUDOWICZ
serve as a basis for precise delimitation of a postulated boundary line between 
Poland and the Soviet Union in East Prussia.
As to the description of the frontier in the Chapter VI of the Potsdam Agree­
ment, the delimitation is certainly land-oriented which can be deduced from 
the formulas used the section ... adjacent to the Baltic Sea and a point on the 
eastern shore o f the Bay o f Danzig, in connection with the direction of deli­
mitation. The delimitation of the Polish-German frontier in the west (a line runn­
ing from the Baltic Sea immediately west o f Swinemunde) confirms the opinion 
that the Parties to the Potsdam Agreement did not intend to delimit mariti­
me areas including the Bay of Vistula. The delimitation of land areas (north o f 
Braunsberg-Goldap) is not precise and could not constitute a basis for a de­
marcation of territorial sovereignty of the two directly concerned states. The 
parties were fully conscious of insufficiency of the delimitation, as they subjec­
ted expressis verbis their acceptance of the ultimate transfer of the area of 
Konigsbcrg to the USSR to a very precise condition: expert examination o f the 
actual frontier. Such a provision testifies that the parties did not treat these 
accomplished facts as settling the problem of delimitation in a definite manner. 
It is to remark that the acceptance by the Great Powers was conditioned not 
only by the decision taken by Soviet experts but also by the common expert 
verification of the demarcation of the frontier.
It can be concluded that the decision of Potsdam does not meet the 
requirements of finality and precision of the postulated territorial settlement. If 
interpreted in good faith, according to an ordinary meaning of express ions used, 
in the given context, in the light of its purpose and object, the Potsdam Agreement, 
and in particular its Chapter VI in connection with Chapter IX.B, is not a de­
finitive, precise, conventional settlement of the territorial sovereignty over East 
Prussia and of an eventual delimitation of the frontier between Poland and the 
USSR in this area. The Polish-Soviet agreement of 27 July 1944 mentioned 
above docs not constitute an instrument relating to the Potsdam Agreement which 
could be treated as the context for interpretation.13
2.2. Later agreements and practice connected with 
the implementation of the Potsdam Agreement
The problem of the delimitation between Poland and the Soviet Union in 
East Prussia after the Potsdam conference should be considered in order to verify 
its effects from the point of view of general law of treaties. Two weeks after the 
conclusion of the Potsdam Agreement, on 16 August 1945 an agreement on the 
delimitation of the Polish-Soviet frontier was concluded. Its Article 3 provides 
that the section o f the Polish-Soviet frontier adjacent to the Baltic Sea ... will
13 The parties to the agreement were not competent to dispose neither of East Prussia nor of 
Danzig; the Polish Committee of National Liberation was not legitimate (did not possess jus 
representalionis) with respect of the Nation and Polish State, and could not conclude international 
obligations binding for Poland.
THE POLISH—RUSSIAN DELIMITATION . . . 51
pass from the point on the eastern shore o f the Bay o f Danzig ... to the east, 
north o f Braunsberg—Gołdap, to the meeting point o f this line with the line 
provided in Article 2 o f the present agreement,14
This provision repealed15 the regulation of Chapter VI of the Potsdam Agree­
ment with all his features: land-oriented delimitation with the vector of delimi­
tation directed up-land, and a general character of the description. However, 
the politics offaits accompli by the USSR dominates this solution and has chang­
ed the concept of the delimitation.
If one evaluates this agreement in its relation to the Potsdam Agreement 
from the point of view of general law of treaties, one must state that it is not 
a subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation o f 
the treaty or the application o f its provisions. Only one of the parties to the 
Potsdam Agreement was a signatory to the agreement of 16 August 1945, without 
any consultation or acceptance of the remaining parties. The other signatory, 
Poland, was a third state from the point of view of the Potsdam Agreement.
Formally, taking into account the letter of the agreement, the signatories 
followed the provisions of the earlier agreement. The delimitation was accom­
panied by the clause in accordance with the decision o f the conference o f Berlin 
(i.e. with the Potsdam Agreement -  T.J.) and was drafted pending the final 
determination o f territorial questions by the peace settlement. Therefore, the 
parties accepted a bilateral modus vivendi, on a temporary basis, not infringing 
formally the Potsdam Agreement.
One can consider whether the conclusion to the contrary is not correct, taking 
into account the fact that a substantive delimitation took place, i.a. the Bay of 
Vistula was divided. Subsequently, the USSR made impossible the implemen­
tation of the annex to the agreement of 16 August 1945 by establishing the 
military harbour Baltijsk in the Strait of Pilau connecting the Bay of Vistula 
with the high sea and proclaiming a prohibited military zone in the northern part 
of the Bay. Poland did not protest against these acts what made impression of 
the acquiescence on its part. Did these facts constitute the practice generating 
legal effects from the perspective of the Potsdam Agreement?
It is unquestionable that these facts cannot be treated as a subsequent 
practice in the application o f the treaty which establishes the agreement o f 
the parties regarding its interpretation.16 They cannot even be considered as 
a practice dealing with the interpretation and application of the Potsdam Agree­
ment, as being in fact contra legem, and based upon a clear abuse of rights 
stemming from this agreement by the USSR. The Soviet Union did not fulfil 
conditions provided by it. The practice was held without any acceptance by the 
other parties to the agreement and cannot prove any understanding among them
14 10 UNTS 193.
15 It should be emphasized that this provision omits the expressions Lithuania and East 
Prussia, and it refers more to the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pad  rather than to the Curzon line.
16 Art. 31 al. 3 (b) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, codifying customary
law.
52 TADEUSZ JASUDOWICZ
as to the interpretation of the agreement. It does not even demonstrate the exis­
tence of an agreement between the two states directly concerned, as it violates 
Article 3 of the Agreement of 16 August 1945 and the annex thereto. The argu­
ment on acquiescence cannot be accepted because of the total dependence of the 
People’s Republic of Poland of the USSR.
On 5 March, 1957 Poland and the USSR concluded in Moscow an agree­
ment on the delimitation and demarcation of the Polish-Soviet frontier in the 
area adjacent to the Baltic Sea. It could be expected that after events of 1956 
and a common Polish-Soviet declaration of 18 November 195617 Poland should 
have claimed its rights connected with the problem of East Prussia and the Bay 
of Vistula. In fact, the agreement neither referred to the Potsdam Agreement, 
nor emphasized a condition of a future peace settlement.
The agreement reversed an earlier philosophy of delimitation. The des­
cription of the boundary line begins with the point situated at the farthest east 
up-land and adopts the sea-oriented vector, tracing the frontier westwards to 
the precisely defined point on the eastern shore of the Bay of Vistula, expressly 
dividing a maritime area of the Bay of Vistula and the Spit of Vistula. The 
parties to the agreement behaved as, if they had full competence to establish 
and delimitate the territorial sovereignty in former East Prussia.
The agreement did not contain any provision concerning navigation 
rights of Poland in the area of the Bay of Vistula and Strait of Pilau, referring 
with this respect to the earlier regulation of 1945.18 In practice nothing changed: 
the USSR still kept its huge military harbour of Baltijsk, and the seat of the 
command of the Baltic Fleet; the Soviet part of the Bay of Vistula was still 
transformed into the prohibited military zone, and Poland could not enjoy its 
navigation rights.
It can be stated that neither the Agreement of 1957 nor the practice of its 
implementation, do not constitute an agreement of the parties concerning the 
interpretation and application of the Potsdam Agreement. The legal basis estab­
lished by this Agreement was fully disregarded by both respect of its general 
considerations, and the detailed delimitation of sovereignly in the territory of 
former East Prussia.
Four years later, an agreement on the legal relations on the Polish-Soviet 
frontier, and cooperation, and mutual assistance in the matters connected with 
the boundary was concluded on 15 February 1961.19 This agreement contained 
provisions confirming navigation rights in the Bay of Vistula in favour of Poland, 
as well as certain other rights (c.g. fishing rights); it treated the Bay of Vistula
17 In fact, the declaration did not provide for the regulation of this question. In its basis, 
a status of Soviet forces temporarily residing in Poland was regulated in 1956, and an agreement 
on the repatriation of the population of Polish origin from the USSR to Poland was concluded 
in 1957.
18 The object of these rights cannot be defined simply as a right of innocent passage, as 
the rights were established exclusively in favour of Poland.
19 Cf. Dziennik Ustaw (Official Journal) 1961, No. 47, Item 253.
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and other boundary water areas as shared national resources, provided a common 
exploitation of these resources and created certain bases of international respon­
sibility for damages caused to the other party. The agreement, however, did not 
introduce any new elements concerning the sovereignty and delimitation in the 
territory of former East Prussia, and it did not concern directly fundamental 
problems regulated in the Potsdam Agreement.
From the perspective of the implementation of the rights granted to Po­
land in the Bay of Vistula, the agreement of 1961 remained a dead letter. The 
USSR did not change its policy of militarization of its part of East Prussia, and 
in particular did not resign to treat the Bay of Vistula and the Strait of Pilau 
as a military zone what fully excluded a practical implementation of Poland’s 
navigation rights.
The USSR and other socialist slates used to consider the provisions of the 
Final Act of the CSCE of 1 August 1975 as a final petrification and legitimation 
of the existing frontiers. In this sense the principles of the CSCE Decalogue: III 
-inviolability of boundaries and IV -  territorial integrity of states, were inter­
preted. Perhaps such an attitude was politically justified; however, from the 
legal point of view such a conclusion could not be drawn from the Final Act, in 
particular as this instrument is not a treaty and does not bind the parties. It 
could not replace the peace settlement provided by the Potsdam Agreement. Such 
an interpretation of the principles III and IV, beyond the context of other prin­
ciples, is contrary to express provisions of the Declaration of Principles of the 
Final Act, according to which all principles have a basic and fundamental posi­
tion, and none of them should be considered separately.
In my opinion, the conference Two plus Four could be considered either as 
a final settlement or as a subsequent agreement of the parties regarding the 
interpretation or application of the Potsdam Agreement. The dissolution of the 
Soviet Union and establishing of the Russian Federation, separated from the 
Kaliningrad Area by independent Lithuania and Belarus, could not petrify the 
Soviet sovereignty over the part of former East Prussia, established in the way 
of the accomplished facts by the Soviets. On the contrary, it seems that these 
issues made the problem of the northern part of East Prussia actual again as an 
object of discussions and international projects.20
2.3. Relevant rules of international law
In any case, certain doubts as to the context of the Potsdam Agreement remain 
actual. Let us add that according to the law of treaties in order to establish 
a correct interpretation of the agreement one should take into account relevant 
rules o f international law applicable in the relations between the parties.21
20 See: a report from the international conference Kaliningrad -  the centre o f the Baltic 
Cooperation, Svetlogorsk, 27 -  30 May 1992.
21 Art. 31 al. 3 (c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969.
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The object of the present study could and should be considered from the 
perspective of fundamental, peremptory, and universally binding principles of 
international law.22 It is not a place for a detailed analysis. In any case one can 
state that these principles cannot legalize illegal accomplished facts and do not 
nullify effects of a general principle ex iniuria non oritur jus. The principle of 
performance of international obligations in good faith guarantees fundamental 
rights granted to Poland by the Potsdam agreement and by the bilateral agree­
ments with the USSR. The principle of non-interference in domestic affairs of 
states excludes any acts of coercion by foreign states (including the USSR) which 
could affect Poland’s vital interests. The principle of sovereign integrity and 
observance of sovereign rights does not exclude a possibility of a peaceful mo­
dification of frontiers.
The Polish-Soviet delimitation can be evaluated also from the point of view 
of the general law of the sea, what is of great importance in the context of the 
division of the Bay of Vistula and the Spit of Vistula. Analysing the decisions 
of the Powers and travaux preparatoires to the Potsdam Agreement one can 
conclude that they aimed at the restitution of Poland as the powerful and demo­
cratic state, disposing of a large access to the sea being a source of her economic 
development and growing welfare of her inhabitants. This aim should be realized 
i.a. thanks to advantages from navigation and trade on the Oder via the port 
Szczecin-Swinoujścic (Stcltin-Swinemunde) on the one hand, and by the Vistula 
and Nogat connected with the Bay of Vistula, and Strait of Pilau on the other 
hand. In fact, because of the unilateral dictate of the USSR, and because of 
certain unilateral practices by the GDR in the west restricting the access to the 
port of Stettin in the 1980-s violating international law, Poland has been deprived 
of these advantages.
It should be emphasized that the law of the sea docs not allow any state to 
cut off a neighbouring coastal slate from its sovereign right to access to the high 
sea. The general law of the sea has established the rules of delimitation of ma­
ritime zones in the areas adjacent to its coast.23 The dividing of the Bay of Vistula 
by the USSR is a unique event on a world scale. The proclamation of the military 
zone in the northern part of the Bay of Vistula which restricts the traffic of 
Polish ships constitutes a flagrant violation of the law of the sea, or even a cri­
me against the law of the sea, as well as against the interests of coastal popula­
tion of the Bay of Vistula.24
22 I mean the principles codified in Chapter I Aims and Principles of the UN Charter, as 
formulated in the Resolution 2625 (XXV) of 1970 mentioned above and accepted on a regional 
level by the CSCE Final Act of 1975.
23 Cf. Art. 15 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December, 1982, UN Doc. 
A/Conf. 62/122 (1982), in connection with art. 12 of the Geneva Convention on the Territorial 
Sea and Contiguous Zone of 29 April, 1958, 5 16 UNTS 205.
24 Cf. Art. 7 al. 5 of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, in connection with Articles 1 al. 2 
of the 1966 Human Rights Covenants, respectively. The Convention on the Law of the Sea attempts 
to recognize and saveguard special interests of the coastal population.
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The reference to the relevant rules o f international law in order to interpret 
the Potsdam Agreement emphasizes the illegality of the Soviet actions and the 
negative effects of the non-implementation by the USSR of an important provision 
of the Potsdam Agreement: an expert examination of the delimitation by compe­
tent and impartial experts. Taking into account the general rules of interpretation, 
one cannot state that the activities of the USSR (and actually of Russia) in former 
East Prussia are consistent with the Potsdam Agreement.
3. Supplementary means of interpretation
In order to confirm the above interpretation, one should refer to supplemen­
tary means of interpretation, i.e. to the circumstances of its conclusion and to 
the preparatory work. These methods have just been used in the former part of 
this study. I have adopted a certain discretion in regrouping them, taking into 
account historical circumstances of the conclusion of the Potsdam Agreement, 
as well as connecting the preparatory works with the evaluation of arguments 
and/or titles supporting these claims. Competing claims of Poland and the USSR 
have been considered.
3.1. Circumstances of conclusion
Almost immediately after the establishment of the Polish government-in­
exile in Paris in September 1939 the idea was expressed that Future Poland 
should control East Prussia, and a representative of the British government 
agreed that the security o f Poland will require it in the future.25 Subsequently, 
in the note prepared by Ambassador Raczyński after the visit of Prime Minister 
Sikorski in London one reads: The French pronounce for the incorporation o f 
East Prussia to Poland. The British express serious doubt in this respect, fear­
ing their own public opinion.26 On 24 February 1940 Ambassador Raczyński 
after he had investigated the activities of different British official and semi-offi­
cial circles, reported that from the part of the United Kingdom one presupposes 
an incorporation o f East Prussia into Poland in one form or another in order 
to give us a better access to the sea.21 Polish claims have been accepted by the 
Americans,28 and even the USSR did not oppose them. Stalin declared during 
the meeting with Polish Prime Minister Sikorski in early December of 1941 that 
East Prussia should belong to Poland and the western boundary should be
25 See: Sprawa polska..., op. cit., 132; K. S k u b i s z e w s k i ,  op. cit., 23.
26 Sprawa polska, 119.
27 Quoted by W.T. K o w a l s k i :  ZSRR a granica na Odrze i Nysie Łużyckiej 1941 -  
1945 (The USSR and the Oder-NeiJ3e Frontier 1941 -  1945)  25 (1965). See also: 
K. S k u b i s z e w s k i ,  23.
28 Cf. a telegram of the American Ambassador Biddle to the Secretary of State of 12 October, 
1941, quoted in Foreign Relations vol. I, 373 (1941).
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based on the Oder.29 The British readiness to recognize Polish claims to East 
Prussia as a whole was confirmed by the statements by Minister Eden during 
his meeting with General Sikorski on 9 September 1943, and the letter from 
Prime Minister Churchill to Minister Eden of 6 October 1943.30 Finally, the 
Polish territorial program formulated by the resolution of the Council of Mini­
sters of 7 October 1942 read as follows: Our aim is to incorporate Danzig, 
East Prussia and Silesia o f Oppeln, as well as generally to shift a frontier with 
Germany, and to vindicate the freedom o f the Baltic Sea.31
It can be concluded that the government of Poland clearly formulated its 
claims to East Prussia as a whole as soon as 1939 -  1943, and the four Great 
Powers recognized and supported these claims. It was summarized by a comm­
on statement of the three Powers during the conference of Moscow on 19-31 
October 1943, and followed by the proposal of W. Churchill, made during the 
conference in Teheran: Poland should receive an equal compensation in the 
west including East Prussia, and then repeated that it meant i.a. the incor­
poration o f East Prussia into Poland.32 The positive attitude of the Great Powers 
towards the recognition and support of the Polish claims with respect of East 
Prussia as a whole was therefore elaborated before the conference of Teheran. 
The Great Powers were bound by these proposals according to the estoppel rule. 
The stance of Stalin in Teheran was therefore fully surprising. In reaction to the 
speech by Churchill, Stalin declared that Russia would need open ports o f 
Konigsberg and Memel, as well as respective part o f East Prussia. He lied 
that the Russians did not possess any open port in the Baltic Sea and that the 
territories in question were Slavonic from time immemorial.33 Stalin treated his 
new claim as a condition sine qua non of the Soviet acceptance of the formula 
proposed by Churchill. Eventually, Stalin convinced Churchill and Roosevelt 
to recognize temporarily the Soviet claims, though no provision was introduced 
into official recordings of the conference. From the legal point of view, the 
decision was not consulted (to say nothing of the acceptance) with Poland as the 
directly interested state. In fact, the proposed settlement was never announced 
to the Polish govcrnmcnt-in-cxilc which was not aware of the situation and 
repeated its claims concerning the incorporation of East Prussia into Poland 
in 1944.
On the other hand, Stalin constantly presented his territorial claims. His 
effectiveness in forcing the Western Powers to accept Soviet claims was con­
firmed during the conference of Quebec on 11 -  15 September 1944, the British—
29 See: Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations 1939 - 1945, vol. I, 274, 365 (1961); 
W.T. K o w a l s k i ,  op. cit., 34.
30 Sprawa polska, 407; K. S k u b i s z e w s k i ,  31.
31 Quoted by W.T. K o w a l s k i ,  26 -  27.
32 Cf. The Conferences at Cairo and Teheran 1943 603 (1961).
33 Sprawa polska, 429. See: also T. J a s u d o w i c z :  Prusy Wschodnie w kontekście II 
wojny światowej i likwidacji je j skutków (East Prussia in the Context o f the Second World War 
and o f the Elimination o f its Consequences) 10 (1991).
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American meeting at Malta on 30 January -  2 February 1945, and the Crimean 
conference on 4-11 February 1945. However, even the documentation of the 
latter does not lead to equivocal conclusions, as Churchill stated thal/Zn? territory 
of Poland should comprise (...) the territory o f East Prussia west and south o f  
Konigsberg, according to the position of the US Poland should receive 
compensation in the form o f German territories including a part o f East Prussia 
with Konigsberg, and even Molotov after he had agreed the text of an agreement 
proposed to add a remark on the restoring o f the Poland’s old frontiers in East 
Prussia and along the Oder.34.
According to the Yalta Agreement, Poland should receive substantial 
accession of territory in the North and West, but an American suggestion was 
accepted that the final delimitation of the Western frontier o f Poland should 
thereafter await the Peace Conference.35 The opinion expressed by Eden on 20 
February 1945 that the British government in principle did not reject a possi­
bility of the final settlement of this problem during the Crimean conference, 
without awaiting the future peace conference,36 was therefore not decisive, neither 
was the Soviet decision accepting the establishment of the Polish administration 
in the part of East Prussia delimited unilaterally by the USSR.37
Diplomatic documents presented above, evidence that the Great Powers 
recognized the danger connected with the existence of the East Prussian excla­
ve for Poland, as well as the existence of the iunctim between the Polish territorial 
accession in East Prussia and wide, free and economically important access to 
the sea. Each of the three powers separately, as well as together recognized the 
Polish claims to East Prussia as a whole, and so did France. Nothing justified 
the change of the stance of the powers which should be bound by their decision 
according to the principle of estoppel. The claim presented by Stalin in Teheran 
was accompanied by the lie, and the claim itself was neither precise, nor explicitly 
recognized. The historical circumstances of the conclusion of the Potsdam Agree­
ment do not oppose to the conclusion drawn from the text of the agreement that 
the regulation was provisional and imprecise, and the final settlement of the 
problem was dclibe-ratcly left to the future peace conference.
3.2. Travaux preparatoires
I consider under this term not only the documentation of the Potsdam confe­
rence, but also earlier meetings of representatives of the Great Powers, and 
a diplomatic correspondence. Let us be reminded that during the conference of 
Teheran Stalin presented arguments concerning open ports, security of the USSR, 
and finally he joined an idea of historic title advanced by Churchill. I compare 
the arguments of the both claimants.
34 Quoted by W.T. K o w a l s k i ,  240.
35 Foreign Relations o f the United States, vol. VII, 974 (1947).
36 W.T. K o w a 1 s k i, op. cit., 208 -  209.
37 K. S k u b i s z e w s k i, op. cit., 47.
58 TADEUSZ JASUDOWICZ
3.2.1. Geographical and economic title
The argument concerning open ports was presented by Stalin earlier during 
the negotiations on 23 August 1939, when he forced Ribbentrop to contact Hitler 
and to agree for the shifting of planned demarcation between the zones o f interest 
to the northern frontier of Lithuania in order to incorporate open ports of Lipau 
and Vindau (both in Latvia) into the USSR.
This argument cannot be taken seriously as the USSR has got numerous 
open ports along her coasts, and at that time the Soviets possessed a powerful 
fleet of ice-breakers. On the other hand, there is no title to open ports recognized 
under international law. In fact, no geographic title in favour of the Soviet claim 
should be considered in the context of the incorporation of East Prussia into the 
far-removed Russian Federative Soviet Republic. It could only be taken into 
account in connection with the sovereignty of the USSR over Lithuania integrated 
with the Soviet Empire38 but cannot be referred to after the dissolution of the 
USSR when the region of Kaliningrad is separated from Russia by the territories 
of independent stale Lithuania and Belarus.
On the contrary, Polish statesman R. Dmowski emphasized after the end of 
the First World War that, if the Baltic coast between the estuaries of the rivers 
Vistula and Ncmen (between Danzig and Konigsbcrg) had been left to Germany, 
it would have isolated it from its Polish hinterland. Consequently, it would remain 
economically dead and the way to progress would be closed for it. Dmowski 
suggested that the section of the Baltic coast with the estuaries of the Vistula 
and Nemcn should be incorporated into Poland.39
One must pay attention to the hydrography of East Prussia. Its main navigable 
waterway is Pregola collecting water from the north and south. Existing artificial 
connections including the Channel of Elbing and Mazurian Channel link Pregola 
with the complex of Mazurian lakes and with the system of the Nemen. The 
existing system could play an important role in the development of the territory. 
Moreover, East Prussia is connected through the Nogat river with the system of 
the Vistula and further with the European water network. Taking into account 
the access to the Baltic Sea through the Bay of Vistula and Strait of Pilau, port 
tradition of Elbląg (Elbing) and the possible access of big ships to the port of 
Kaliningrad (Konigsbcrg) through the adapted navigable channel of the Bay of 
Vistula, we obtain an optimistic image of the potential trade and economic 
advantages of the water system.
The territory of Poland is the important hinterland for East Prussia than the 
USSR/Russian Federation, and East Prussia constitutes an economically indis­
pensable bridge from a part of Poland to the Baltic Sea.40
38 These territorial rights were based upon the aggression of 15 June 1940, and constituted in 
fact an illegal occupation.
39 R. D m o w s k i: Polityka polska i odbudowanie Państwa. Pisma {Polish Policy and the 
Reconstruction o f the Slate. Writings), vol. VI. 357 et seq. (1937).
40 It is characteristic that the ideological declaration of the communist-oriented Union of
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3.2.2. Military and security reasons
According to the Soviet Union, the incorporation of East Prussia was 
absolutely necessary front the point of view of the security of the Soviet Empire. 
Was it really necessary as a measure of precaution against the feared German 
policy of aggression provided in Article 53.1 of the UN Charter, if the USSR 
disposed of the occupation zone in Germany transformed later in the GDR, and 
stationed powerful units of the Northern Group of the Soviet Army in the whole 
territory of Poland?
It was clear that the main object of the action undertaken by Stalin was not 
the security of the USSR but rather outflanking Poland (despite the establish­
ment of the communist government and the imposing of the Soviet regime) and 
Lithuania (the resistance against its liberation by the Soviets and rein-corpo­
ration into the Soviet Empire persisted till 1952). The Soviet sovereignty in 
East Prussia served the subjugation of Central and Eastern Europe rather than 
the suppression of the German Drang nach Osten.
The dissolution of the USSR, the restoration of independent Lithuania and 
Belarus, finally shook the Soviet arguments. No one can say in good faith that 
Russian sovereignty over the Kaliningrad area is indispensable from the point 
of view of strategic and security needs of the Russian Federation. Moreover, no 
one can declare that any form of the Russian presence (including a military one) 
in this area serves well to the needs of security in the Baltic area, and in Europe 
in general.
On the contrary, the arguments of security support clearly the Polish claims 
to East Prussia as a whole. Even before the creation of Poland after the First 
World War, politicians emphasized the risk of being surrounded by German 
territory from the north and the west. The militarization of East Prussia in the 
interwar period and the aggression against Poland realized this danger. So the 
security arguments accompanied the economic arguments presented by Poland 
with the claims to East Prussia during the Second World War.
Polish experience after the Second World War including the events of 1956 
and 1980- 1981 confirmed these arguments. At present, the potential danger 
resulting from the existence of the Russian exclave in East Prussia increases as 
the sense of security after the abolishing of the iron curtain grows. It is connected 
with the stationing of numerous troops and the storage of enormous quantities 
of arms including nuclear weapons withdrawn from Poland and the former 
GDR. The area of Kaliningrad has been turned into a huge barrel of pulver, the 
existence of which constitutes the direct danger for the vital interest of Poland 
and other states.
It can be concluded that from the point of view of the security and strategic 
interests the Sovict/Russian title cannot compete with the clear and generally 
comprehensible interests of Poland.
Polish Patriots in the USSR of 10 June 1943 stated that East Prussia should become a bridge 
between Poland and the Baltic Sea. Cf. Polska Ludowa, op. cit., 615.
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3.3.3. Historie title
The argument on historie title of the USSR was in fact presented by Churchill, 
who wrote in a letter to Stalin of 20 February 1944 that he treated the Second 
World War as the thirty-year war begun in 1914 and emphasized that East 
Prussia is a soil stained with Russian blood, so that Russians have a histo­
rical and well-founded claim to this German territory.41
The reference by Churchill to the boundaries of Russia of 1914 and the notion 
of the thirty-year war recall the expose by Molotov during the 5lh Extraordinary 
Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on 31 October 1939 in which the 
speaker justified the aggression against Poland.42 International law does not 
recognize any title based upon the stain of blood of any national, and the idea of 
such a title is inhuman and extremely dangerous.
There was no opportunity to establish any historic title of Russia with respect 
to East Prussia. In 1758 Russia invaded this territory and subsequently offered 
it to Poland in exchange of the part of Inflant area.43 In the mid-18th century 
Russia was therefore not interested in the area of Prussia; probably being fully 
aware of tics binding Electoral Prussia with Poland. Neither Russia nor the 
USSR claimed the territory of East Prussia before the conference of Teheran. 
The historic title of Russia cannot be seriously considered under these cir­
cumstances.
Polish tics with the territory of Prussia reach back to the beginnings of the 
statehood. One can refer to the mission of St. Adalbert in Prussia, to the accep­
tance by the Pope of the bishopric in Włocławek with the task to organize 
missions in Prussia. Prince Konrad of Mazovia invited the Teutonic Order to 
Poland in connection with the proclaiming by the Pope of the mission and crusade 
in Prussia, in order to conquest Prussia for the Christianity.
In the 15lh century, an important movement in favour of connections with 
Poland were present in Prussia and the Prussian Orders forced the Teutonic 
Knights to conclude a treaty in 1435. The Treaty limited the autonomy of the 
Teutonic Order and assured the freedom o f social and economic contacts 
between Poland and Prussia, and in particular the freedom of trade.
This trend was continued by the creation of the Union of Prussian Towns 
in 1440. The Union renunciatcd the sovereignty of the Teutonic Order, started 
an uprising and proposed the Polish King to establish his sovereignty over whole 
Prussia. The Act of Incorporation of Prussia to the Polish Crown was edited on 
6 March, 1454 and referred to the old titles of Polish monarchs to the territories 
in question. After the thirteen year war, according to the peace treaty of Toruń 
(Thorn) of 19 October 1466 all Prussian territories -  including the part of Prussia
41 Sprawa polska, 476 ff.
42 Text published i.a. in L. S z c z ę ś n i a k  (cd.): Zmowa. IV rozbiór Polski (The Plot. 4'h 
Partition o f Poland) 181 ff (199 1).
43 All historical issues quoted according to Historia Dyplomacji Polskiej (The History o f the 
Polish Diplomacy), vol. I -  11, passim (1982).
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remaining under ihc administration of the Teutonic Order -  were subjected to 
the sovereignty of the Polish Kingdom.
Subsequently the treaty of 1525 between the Polish king Zygmunt Stary and 
the Great Master Albrecht Hohenzollern sanctioned the dissolution of the 
Teutonic Order (the secularization of Prussia). Hohenzollern as the secular prince 
remained a vassal of the king of Poland with the title o f the prince in Prussia, 
not o f Prussia, as the Polish king was the sovereign o f Prussia.
If these conditions had been kept, the Principality of Prussia should have 
been incorporated into Poland in 1618. However, because of the support of the 
Polish claims in Inflant area in 1562 -  1563 Poland accepted the succession of 
the house of Brandenburg in Prussia. The elector of Brandenburg succeeded in 
obtaining the Polish acceptance for the investiture of his son Friedrich Wilhelm 
in Prussia. After his father’s death, the latter rallied the power both in Bran­
denburg and Prussia.
The new prince used an opportunity created by the Swedish aggression 
against Poland and concluded in a treaty with Moscow in 1656 and two treaties 
with Poland in 1657. According to the latter, Poland resigned of the Prussian 
vassalage. Although the treaties of 19 September and 6 November 1657 granted 
full sovereign rights (jus supremi domini) in Prussia to Friedrich Wilhelm and 
his male descendants, they preserved certain ties between Prussia and Poland. 
In particular they contained a condition that after the extinction of the male line 
of the Hohcnzollcrns Prussia would have returned to Poland.
It is a paradox of the history that this condition was realized after the Second 
World War through the extinction of the Hohcnzollcrns, and through the 
dissolution of the Prussian State by the Law No. 46 of the Control Council for 
Germany. These events were preceded by precise Polish claims to the territory 
of East Prussia as a whole. The historic title supported by the Polish claims, and 
the realization of the condition formulated in the treaties of 1657 could, and 
should have found support in the loss of a part of territory of the aggressor state 
(in this case: Germany) as one of the forms of international responsibility for 
aggression.44
Summing up, also from the point of view of the historic title (and in particular 
from this point of view) the Soviet/Russian claim to East Prussia cannot compete 
with the Polish title. The Soviet claim was contrary to the estoppel rule and the 
satisfying of these claim constituted in fact inadmissible gratification of the co­
aggressor against Poland of 1939 and therefore violated the principle ex iniuria 
non oritur jus.
44 In fact the co-aggressor was not only granted with the title to the territories incorporated 
illegally in 1939 bur received also the northern part of East Prussia with Konigsberg.
